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Comments
"DURING THE TENDER OFFER" (OR SOME OTHER TIME
NEAR IT): INSIDER TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
ALL HOLDERS/BEST PRICE RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
A crucial element of many strategic business acquisitions is retaining
the continued employment of the target company's key employees (such
as senior management and star talent) by offering appropriate incentives.1
This is often accomplished by means of employment agreements and re-
tention packages between the acquirer and target employee-shareholder. 2
A potential violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Ex-
change Act) may arise when these dealings occur simultaneously with the
negotiations of the terms of the acquisition. 3
Specifically, side transactions with target company employee-share-
holders may violate Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14d-10.
Rule 14d-10, which is commonly referred to as the All Holders/Best Price
Rule, mandates that all tendering shareholders receive the "highest con-
sideration paid to any other security holder during such tender offer."'4 If
a court finds that an arrangement to acquire employee stock violates Rule
14d-10, it may order the acquirer to pay the difference between the tender
1. See Shearman & Sterling, Recent Developments Related to Employment Arrange-
ments in the Context of Public Tender Offers and Exchange Offers 1 (Mar. 2001) (provid-
ing client publication regarding tender offers and All Holders/Best Price Rule),
available at http://www.shearman.com/documents/MA.0301.pdf. Despite the
fact that merger volume is currently running well below the levels of a year ago,
tender offerors are still spending big money in strategic acquisitions. See Business
Brief-Temple-Inland Inc.: New Merger Deal Is Signed with Gaylord Container, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 22, 2002, at C7 (discussing $65 million tender offer); Walter Hamilton, New
Deals May Signal Merger Resurgence; Outlook: Are Corporate Chiefs Again Willing to Take
Linkup Risks?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at C1 (noting that deals are still being
made despite slow merger activity generally); Robin Sidel, Weyerhaeuser Bid Wins
64% Support in Target Company, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at B8 (discussing $6.1
billion tender offer).
2. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (stating typical business prac-
tices). To ensure that future employment is secured, acquirers often "assume the
stock option plans of a target company and 'roll over' outstanding target stock
options." Id. at 1 n.1. When stock prices are depressed and options are "under
water," there is "a greater need to develop and implement new incentive programs
in connection with acquisition transactions." Id.
3. See id. (notifying clients of uncertainty surrounding All Holders/Best Price
Rule). For examples of transactions found in violation of federal securities laws,
see infra notes 50-52, 60-64, 75-77, 83-86 and accompanying text.
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2001) (stating Rule 14d-10). For a further dis-
cussion of SEC Rule 14d-10, see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
(677)
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price and the value of the employee agreement to all shareholders who
tendered their stock.5 Such a ruling could increase the cost of the acquisi-
tion far beyond the acquirer's anticipations. 6
Liability under Rule 14d-10 turns on whether or not the insider trans-
action is considered to be "during such tender offer."7 A classic tender
offer generally involves a public announcement to purchase a specified
number of shares at a specified price during a set period of time.8 While
the provisions of Rule 14d-10 worked well in this classic sense, what has
since developed are non-classic tender offers-tender offers near in time
to separate transactions to acquire the stock of insiders and employees.
These insider transactions do not fit the classic model, resulting in litiga-
tion as to whether such transactions occurred "during" the tender offer
and under the requirements of Rule 14d-10.9
Because neither Congress nor the SEC has clearly defined the term
"tender offer," courts have been left to decide when and if a Rule 14d-10
violation has occurred in this non-classic situation. Courts differ, however,
as to what activity constitutes a tender offer for Rule 14d-10 purposes. To
date, three standards for evaluating the validity of special agreements with
inside shareholders tied to a tender offer have evolved. The Second Cir-
cuit has applied a "functional" test to determine if the tender offer and
disputed transactions should be viewed as a single transaction. 10 Other
circuits have developed a very similar "integral part of the tender offer"
test where the relative importance of the side transaction to the success of
5. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing cause for concern);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2001) (stating that "such person shall pay the in-
creased consideration to each security holder whose securities are taken up and
paid for pursuant to the tender offer...").
6. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 3 (articulating consequences of
Rule 14d-10 violation). To illustrate the cause for alarm, consider this hypotheti-
cal. Corporation X has 10 million shares outstanding. An acquirer announces a
tender offer for all shares at $100 per share. The Chief Executive Officer of Cor-
poration X is to stay on in his current capacity after the acquisition. He owns 1
million shares and has arranged a special agreement where he is to receive an
average price of $110 per share. If a court finds that this agreement constitutes
additional consideration paid during the tender offer, the court could order the
acquirer to pay the additional $10 for the remaining 9 million shares, thereby in-
creasing the total cost of the acquisition by $90 million.
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2001) (providing language of Rule 14d-10).
8. See 113 CONG. REc. 855 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (explaining
classic tender offers).
9. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (demonstrat-
ing uncertainty as to meaning of "during" the tender offer); Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,
50 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir. 1995) (same), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 944-
45 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d
1360, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (same); Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632,
635 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (same).
10. See Field, 850 F.2d at 944-45 (holding that purchases of stock from direc-
tors of target corporation after purported withdrawal of tender offer could consti-
tute continuation of tender offer from "functional" perspective).
[Vol. 47: p. 677
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the tender offer is examined. 11 In contrast to these circuits are those cir-
cuits that rely on a "bright-line timing" approach in which all conduct
prior and subsequent to the tender period is deemed outside the tender
offer. 12 Consequently, a split has emerged among the courts of appeals,
which has been exacerbated by the district courts that have given support
to each of the approaches.' 3
In addition to the ambiguity created by the contrasting approaches
courts follow, 14 there is further uncertainty as to the result of a Rule 14d-
10 challenge under the "functional" and "integral part" tests. 15 The un-
certainty of the current circuit split, combined with the potential severity
of a Rule 14d-10 violation, necessitates the uniform adoption of a single
validity test.
This Comment argues that the SEC or the United States Supreme
Court should remove the ambiguity regarding the application of Rule 14d-
10 by recognizing the "bright-line timing" standard as the single validity
test. Part II provides background on the Williams Act and Rule 14d-10,
and it discusses the problems surrounding the definition of the term
"tender offer."1 6 Part III identifies the different tests used to define
"tender offer" and examines the courts' reasonings in applying each of the
11. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 655 (finding for plaintiff shareholders, court deter-
mined that tender offer period is not limited by any time frame and that director
side transactions were integral parts of tender offer).
12. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246 (concluding that because consideration paid to
majority shareholder was determined prior to commencement of tender offer, pay-
ment was not made during tender offer and therefore is not within Rule 14d-10).
13. See Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (finding Lerro standard most persua-
sive); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (dismissing defendants' motion to dismiss inves-
tors' class action alleging violations of All Holders/Best Price Rule after adopting
and applying Ninth Circuit "integral part" test).
14. Compare Epstein, 50 F.3d at 657 (applying "integral part of tender offer"
test), Field, 850 F.2d at 950 (applying "functional" test), and Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
646 (applying "integral part of tender offer" test), with Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246 (apply-
ing bright-line test), and Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (applying bright-line test).
As these cases demonstrate, the test a court applies often determines the outcomes
of claims under Rule 14d-10 in that defendant-acquirers fair best under the bright-
line standard. Compare Epstein, 50 F.3d at 657 (reversing defendants' summary
judgment), and Field, 850 F.2d at 950 (reversing defendants' summary judgment),
and Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (denying defendants' motion to dismiss), with
eI-rro, 84 F.3d at 246 (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' claim), and Walker, 145 F.
Supp. 2d at 1378 (granting defendants' motion to dismiss).
15. Compare Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656 (finding agreements integral to tender of-
fer), and Field, 850 F.2d at 945 (finding single transaction after applying "func-
tional" standard), with McMichael v. United States Filter Corp., No. EDCV 99-182,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2001) (finding transaction
not integral to tender offer), and Priddy v. Edelman, 679 F. Supp. 1425, 1432 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (finding separate transactions because tender offer was terminated
when defendant's shares were purchased).
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different approaches. 17 Part IV recommends that either the Supreme
Court or the SEC permanently resolve the issue by adopting a "bright-line
timing" approach.' 8 Finally, in the event that the "bright-line timing" ap-
proach is not uniformly adopted, Part V provides suggestions and recom-
mendations for acquirers structuring future transactions so as to avoid the
ramifications of the more subjective. "functional" and "integral part of the
tender offer" tests. 19
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Williams Act
Congress passed the Exchange Act in response to the Great Depres-
sion. 20 Its purpose was to regulate trading transactions in order to restore
and maintain the integrity of U.S. securities markets.2 ' The Exchange Act
identifies a "laundry list" of problems and abuses that Congress found re-
sponsible for the 1929 crash. 22 The SEC was created through section 4 of
the Exchange Act and was given the responsibility of resolving the articu-
lated abuses so as to implement the purpose of the Exchange Act.2 3 One
of the problem areas that developed over the years was corporate
takeovers.2 4
Before the 1960s, acquirers most often solicited proxies or utilized
exchange offers of securities in order to accomplish corporate takeovers. 25
Section 14 of the Exchange Act regulated proxy solicitations, while section
5 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposed disclosure and registration require-
ments on exchange offers.26 During the 1960s, cash tender offers became
17. For a further discussion of the "functional," "integral part of the tender
offer" and "bright-line timing" tests, see infra notes 51, 59, 91 and accompanying
text.
18. For a further discussion promoting uniform acceptance of a "bright-line
timing" approach, see infra notes 116-62 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of recommended courses of action with regards
to side transactions and tender offers, see infra notes 183-91 and accompanying
text.
20. SeeJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 3(3d ed. 2001) (identifying Great Depression as source of political momentum be-
hind securities regulation).
21. See id. at 8-9 (identifying purpose of Exchange Act).
22. See id. at 7 (noting that section 2 of Exchange Act summarizes abuses re-
sponsible for crash of 1929).
23. See id. (explaining creation of SEC).
24. For a further discussion, see infra notes 25-31.
25. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (examining Wil-
liams Act). Solicitations include "any other writings which are part of a continuous
plan ending in solicitation and which prepare the way for its success." SEC v.
Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). An "exchange offer" refers to the part of a
bilateral contract that includes "the consideration for [the] ultimate contract when
the offer is accepted." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 22 (identifying takeover vehicles); see also 15 U.S.C.§ 78n (2001) (regulating proxies); 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2001) (regulating exchange
offers).
[Vol. 47: p. 677
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the preferred method for effectuating corporate takeovers. 27 Tender of-
fers, however, did not fall within existing disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act.28 The lack of regulation al-
lowed bidders to extend tender offers without disclosing information ma-
terial to the offer.29 In addition, bidde'rs would restrict the offer to a
limited number of shares, accept tendered shares on a first-come, first-
serve basis and make the tender period very brief.30 This situation, re-
ferred to as a "Saturday night special," pressures investors into making de-
cisions based upon severely limited information. 3 1
Congress reacted to the increased use of cash tender offers by enact-
ing the Williams Act ("the Act") in 1965.32 The Act's purpose was to fill
27. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 22 (identifying growing use of cash tender offers as
purpose of adopting Williams Act); E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 2-10 (1973) (discussing rise in use of cash tender offers as
methods for acquiring corporate control); Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russel A. Taus-
sig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REV. 135, 137 (Mar.-Apr. 1967)
(same).
28. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 22 (delineating need for 1968 Williams amend-
ments); Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 113-14 (4th Cir. 1993) (identifying Con-
gress' motivation for Williams Act), aff'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir.
1993); Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining
reason for section 14(d)). In a cash tender offer, a bidder campaigns to buy a set
number of shares of a company's stock for a specified price. See Piper, 430 U.S. at
22 (summarizing tender offers).
29. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 55 (explaining that "[p]rior to the Williams
Act a tender offeror had no obligation to disclose any information to shareholders
when making a bid"); see also Henry L. "Scott" Nearing, III, Note, Kahn v. Virginia
Retirement System: The Impact of Rule lOb-5's Corporate Disclosure Requirements on the
Williams Act's Tender Offer and Best Price Rules, 40 VILL. L. REV. 263, 268 (1995)
(discussing investor protection under Williams Act).
30. See 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967) (discussing need for "best-price" rule). Ac-
cording to Senator Williams, this provision was designed to reduce pressures on
target shareholders to hastily tender their shares and eliminate the acquirer's abil-
ity to make "Saturday night special" tender offers. See id. (discussing need for
"best-price" rule).
31. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 55 ("'Without knowledge of who the bidder
is and what he plans to do, the shareholder cannot reach an informed decision.
He is forced to [act] without adequate information to enable him to decide ration-
ally what is the best possible course of action.'") (quoting S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2-4
(1967)).
32. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 22 (discussing adoption of Williams Act); see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (2001) (providing Williams amendments to Ex-
change Act). Senator Harrison William led the crusade to regulate tender offers.
See 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (discussing need for
legislation to regulate tender offers). As subsequently enacted, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1) requires tender offerors to identify to the SEC the "'background and
identity' of the offeror, the source and amount of funds or other consideration to
be used in making the purchases, the extent of the offeror's holdings in the target
corporation, and the offeror's plans with respect to the structure of the target cor-
poration's business or corporate structure." Piper, 430 U.S. at 22-23 (explaining
protections afforded by Williams Act). Additionally, the.Act provides three bene-
fits to those who tender their stock. See id. at 23. First, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5)
affords tendering shareholders the right to withdraw their tender during the first
5
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the void in federal regulations in order to protect investors. 33 Consistent
with the philosophy of existing securities regulation, Congress' method for
protecting investors was to require "full and adequate disclosures of
tender offers ... by imposing certain obligations on tender offerors dur-
ing the tender offer period." 3
4
Section 14(d) (7) of the Act provides that if a bidder increases the
amount paid for the target shares during the tender offer, all tendering
shareholders are to receive the additional consideration. 35 The tendering
shareholders are to receive the additional consideration even if they ten-
dered their stock before the price increase was announced.3 6 Congress
designed this provision to prevent the acquirer from offering a greater
price to select shareholders.3 7
seven days of the offer and at any time after the offer has been open for sixty days.
See id. Second, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) (6) requires pro rata acceptance of all tendered
shares during the first ten days of the offer when then tender offer is for less than
all outstanding shares and more shares are tendered than requested. See id. Fi-
nally, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) mandates that all tendering shareholders are to re-
ceive the highest consideration paid for any target shares during the tender offer.
See id.
33. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 55 (explaining that "[p]rior to the Williams
Act a tender offeror had no obligation to disclose any information to shareholders
when making a bid."). The increasing popularity of cash tender offers created a
gap in the regulations because tender offers were not governed by federal securi-
ties laws current at the time. See SEC.v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d
945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The Williams Act was intended to ensure that investors
responding to tender offers received full and fair disclosure, analogous to that
received in proxy contests."). See generally H.R. RP. No. 90-1711, at 2-4 (1968)
(discussing need for investor protection); S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2-4 (1967) ("[B]y
using a cash tender offer the person seeking control can operate in almost com-
plete secrecy. [T]he law does not even require that he disclose his identity, the
source of his funds, who his associates are, or what he intends to do if he gains
control of the corporation.").
34. Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1993) (reviewing Williams
Act); see also Piper, 430 U.S. at 35 (stating that purpose of Williams Act was to pro-
tect investors by insuring "that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash
tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate infor-
mation .. " (quoting Roundeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975))).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (providing section 14(d) (7) of Williams Act).
Section 14(d) (7) states:
Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invita-
tion for tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consider-
ation offered to holders of such securities, such person shall pay the
increased consideration to each security holder whose securities are
taken up and paid for pursuant to the tender offer or request or invita-
tion for tenders whether or not such securities have been taken up by
such person before the variation of the tender offer or request or
invitation.
Id.
36. See id. (providing "Best Price" provision). For a further discussion on the
protections of the Williams Act, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 657 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing
that purpose of Rule 14d-10 is to ensure that "holders of the same security are
offered precisely the same consideration"), revd on other grounds sub nom. Matsu-
[Vol. 47: p. 677
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The SEC has taken a position consistent with that of Congress:
(i) a tender offer must be extended to all holders of the class of
securities which is the subject of the offer (the "all holders re-
quirement"); and (ii) all such holders must be paid the highest
consideration offered under the tender offer (the "best-price
rule") .38
Rule 14d-10 was subsequently enacted to codify both the all holders and
best price provisions, thereby requiring that all tendering shareholders re-
ceive equal consideration. 39
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938,
942 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that purpose of 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) "is to prevent a
tender offeror from discriminating in price among tendering shareholders"); S.
REP. No. 90-550, at 10 (1967) (identifying Congress' purpose "to assure fair treat-
ment of those persons who tender their shares at the beginning of the tender
period, and to assure equality of treatment among all shareholders who tender
their shares").
38. Field, 850 F.2d at 942 (quoting Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules, Securities Act Release No. 6595 [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83, at 797 (July 1, 1985)). SEC Release No. 6595 states that:
The purpose of this provision [Rule 14d-10(a)(2)] is to remove a purely
fortuitous factor from the calculation of the amount security holders
should receive for their securities by assuring them of the same price for
their securities regardless of when they are taken up, and to avoid the
discriminatory effect of paying some holders more than others, since se-
curity holders tendering their shares pursuant to a tender offer normally
assume that all tendering security holders will receive the same price.
Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Rule 14d-10(a) (2), Securities Act
Release No. 6595, 33 S.E.C. Docket 762, 1985 WL 61507, at *3 (demonstrating that
SEC's purpose for best-price rule was same as Congress'); see also Epstein, 50 F.3d at
657 (stating purpose of Rule 14d-10 is to ensure that all "holders of the same secur-
ity are offered precisely the same consideration"); Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-
95-20725SW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) ("The
rule prohibits tender offers on a first-come-first-serve basis, or those in which larger
or more influential shareholders are paid a premium for their shares.").
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2001) (providing All Holders/Best Price
Rule); see also Field, 850 F.2d at 942 (discussing codification of the All Holders/Best
Price Rule). Rule 14d-10 states, in pertinent parts, that:
(a) No bidder shall make a tender offer unless:
(1) The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of
securities subject to the tender offer; and
(2) The consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the
tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security
holder during such tender offer....
(c) Paragraph (a) (2) of this section shall not prohibit the offer of more
than one type of consideration in a tender offer, Provided, That:
(1) Security holders are afforded equal right to elect among each of
the types of consideration offered; and
(2) The highest consideration of each type paid to any security
holder is paid to any other security holder receiving that type of
consideration.
Id.
To further protect tendering shareholders from price discrimination in
tender offers, the SEC also promulgated Rule 10b-13, later replaced by Rule 14e-5,
7
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Where a bidder has allegedly purchased shares from some sharehold-
ers under an arrangement different than that of the tender offer, ag-
grieved parties have sought relief under section 14(d) (7) of the Williams
Act and its implementing regulation, SEC Rule 14d-10.40 For protections
both of which prohibit a tender offeror from making any side transactions to
purchase shares during the tender offer on terms other than those set forth in the
tender offer. See Field, 850 F.2d at 943 (discussing additional investor protection).
Unlike the All Holders/Best Price Rule, however, Rule 14e-5 does not provide ag-
grieved shareholders a private right of action. For a further discussion on private
rights of action, see infra note 40 and accompanying text. Rule 14e-5 states, in
pertinent part:
(a) Unlawful activity. As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a
tender offer for equity securities, no covered person may directly or indi-
rectly purchase or arrange to purchase any subject securities or any re-
lated securities except as part of the tender offer.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-5 (2001) (providing Rule 14e-5); see also Cross-Border
Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, 64
Fed. Reg. 61,382 (Nov. 10, 1999) (summarizing new SEC rules). New Rule 14e-5
clarified the former Rule's text and codified a number of SEC staff positions with
respect to old Rule 10b-13, but did not significantly change the substance of the
restrictions on purchases outside a tender offer. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW § 2.18 (2000-2001 ed.) (dis-
cussing new Rule 14e-5); Victor I. Lewkow, The SEC's New M&A Rules-One Year
Later, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 539, 547 (2001) (same). The new
Rule 14e-5 provides that, from the time a tender offer is announced until the time
the offer expires, the acquirer may not purchase securities other than by the terms
of the tender offer-as did old Rule 1Ob-13. See Lewkow, supra, at 547 (discussing
new rule). Purchases are now permitted outside the tender offer "during a subse-
quent offering period so long as the form and amount of consideration for such
purchases are the same as that offered in the tender offer." Id. Other exceptions
include: (1) "purchases pursuant to the exercise of previously owned options or
convertible securities;" (2) "certain purchases by employee benefit plans of the
bidder;" (3) purchases of odd-lot offers; (4) purchases as intermediary; (5)
"purchases in connection with 'basket' transactions;" (6) purchases in covering
transactions; (7) "purchases pursuant to unconditional contractual obligations en-
tered into before the public announcement of the tender offer;" (8) unsolicited
agency or riskless principal purchases by a dealer manager or its affiliates; (9)
"purchases made by certain affiliates of the dealer manager that have appropriate
firewalls in place to prevent the sharing of nonpublic information with the dealer
manager and which are not made for the purpose of facilitating the tender offer;"
and (10) certain purchases by United Kingdom market-makers and other
purchases in certain cross-border tender offers. See id. (listing new exceptions
under new Rule 14e-5); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-5 (2001) (providing Rule 14e-
5).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (2001) (stating that acquirer who increases con-
sideration paid to some shareholders "shall pay the increased consideration" to all
other tendering shareholders). Note that the All Holders/Best Price Rule does
not expressly create a private right of action for aggrieved shareholders. See id.
(providing no explicit private right of action). Courts, however, have consistently
found that the best-price provision impliedly affords a private right of action. See
Epstein, 50 F.3d at 651 (pointing out that SEC's authority to enforce provisions of
Exchange Act is limited to injunctive actions, therefore without private right of
action, there would be no way "to enforce the express statutory command that a
bidder 'shall pay to each security holder' any increased consideration paid to any
other security holder"); Field, 850 F.2d at 946 (determining that private right of
8
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of the Williams Act to be available, there must first be a tender offer.4 1
Once the existence of a tender offer is established, parties alleging a Rule
14d-10 violation have the burden of proving three elements: 1) that the
bidder purchased a security that is the subject of the tender offer; 2) that
this purchase occurred "during the pendency" of the bidder's offer; and
3) that this purchase was for "more consideration than the bidder paid to
other shareholders pursuant to the tender offer."
42
B. "Tender Offer"
While existence of a tender offer is the first requirement in determin-
ing if the Williams Act applies to a transaction, neither Congress nor the
action exists because tendering shareholders are primary beneficiary of Section
14d-7); Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)
(emphasizing critical factor in finding implied private right of action is legislative
intent). In determining whether any given statute provides an implicit private
remedy, several factors are generally considered. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975) (establishing four criteria as traditional analysis for determining whether or
not statutory scheme provides implied private right of action). "First, is the plain-
tiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."' Id. "Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit," either to
create or deny a remedy? Id. "Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy... ?" Id. Finally, "is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?" Id. Further support for a Rule 14d-10 private right of action is
gained from the "broad remedial purposes" of federal securities regulation. SeeJ.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (finding implied private right of action
because chief purpose of Exchange Act is to protect investors).
Plaintiffs seeking relief under a Rule 14e-5 (and former Rule 13b-10) claim
have faired less successfully because courts have expressed doubt as to whether
Rule 14e-5 affords a private right of action. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 648 n.5 (finding
no private right of action under Rule 10b-13 claim); Beaumont v. Am. Can Co.,
797 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding availability of private right of action
under Rule 10b-13 unlikely); Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725SW, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *18 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (dismissing Rule 10b-13 claim
with prejudice); Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 361, 367
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to find private right of action for 10b-13). But see City
Nat. Bank v. Am. Commonwealth Fin. Corp., 801 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1986) (imply-
ing private right of action for Rule 10b-13 claim); C.J. Warren v. Bokum Res. Corp.,
433 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (D.N.M. 1977) (finding implied private right of action
under 10b-13).
41. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (2001) (stating that Regulation 14D applies "to
any tender offer ... subject to section 14(d) (1) of the Act . . ."); see also Lerro v.
Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that Rule 14d-10
"demark clearly the periods of time during which the special Williams Act rules
apply"); Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 13 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir.) ("The Williams Act be-
comes operative when a purchaser makes a tender offer that will result in the pur-
chaser owning more than 5% of the class of stock sought."), affd on other grounds,
13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993); Nearing, supra note 29, at 272 ("To assert a Rule 14d-
10 claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that a tender offer commenced under
Rule 14d-2 prior to the occurrence of the complained purchases.").
42. SeeWalker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1374 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (stating required elements of 14d-10 claim).
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SEC has provided a precise definition of what a tender offer is. 4 3 The
legislative history of the Williams Act demonstrates that section 14(d) was
intended to apply to what can be described as a "classic" or "conventional"
tender offer.4 4 These classic tender offers, the kind being used at the time
the Williams Act was enacted, were generally uniform and straight for-
ward: 1) an offer to buy shares of the target company was extended, typi-
cally by means of newspaper advertisement, to all public shareholders; 2)
the bidder specified the tender price, the number of shares sought, the
length of the tender period, and any other conditions the offeror chose to
impose; and 3) tendering shareholders were required to leave their shares
on deposit until the terms of the offer had been met.45 Applicability of
43. See Kahn, 13 F.3d at 114 (explaining uncertainty surrounding term tender
offer); Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that
"Congress' failure to define 'tender offer' was deliberate."); SEC v. Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985) ("To serve the purposes of the
Williams Act, there is a need for flexibility in fashioning a definition of a tender
offer."). Instead, "tender offer" was only loosely defined because Congress feared
that a precise definition would not be sufficiently broad to cover all transactional
variations. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Financing of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 18 (1967) (statement
of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC) (expressing congressional concern). The
imprecise definition provided courts ample discretion in deciding if and when
there was a tender offer, but the lack of clear guidance also perpetuated problems
that existed prior to the Williams Act. See Adoption of Amendments to Tender
Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,582-83 (Nov. 29, 1979) (identifying pressured
investor decisions resulting from pre-tender offer public announcements as endur-
ing problem).
44. See Hearings on H.R. 14475, S. 510, supra note 43, at 17 (statement of Ma-
nuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC) (describing generally understood characteristics
of tender offers). Manuel Cohen, Chairman of the SEC at the time of the enact-
ment of the Williams Act, described a tender offer in the following terms:
A tender offer is quite different from the ordinary market transaction
with which the average investor is familiar. Insofar as it is an offer at all it
is subject to complex and sometimes deceptive conditions. Rather it is an
invitation to the public security holder who tenders his security to give
the other party an option-to be exercised only if certain minimum
shares are tendered within a specified time and perhaps specifying a max-
imum which the original offeror is prepared to take-but giving him dis-
cretion to accept a lesser or larger amount or to extend the time limits.
Tendering in response to such an offer involves deposit of the public
security holder's shares or obtaining a guarantee from a stock exchange
member or other financially responsible person that they will be
deposited.
Id.; see also 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (describing
traditional tender offer).
45. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Unconventional Offers Under the Williams Act: The
Case for Judicial Restraint, I1 J. CoRP. L. 499, 502 (1986) (describing traditional
tender offers); see also Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 54-55 (describing "typical" tender
offer). See generally Edward Aranow & Herbert Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the
Cash Tender Invitation, 27 Bus. LAw. 415 (1972) (discussing advantages of tender
offer process); Meredith Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amend-
ments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971) (describing broad scope and multiple applications
686 [Vol. 47: p. 677
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the All Holders/Best Price Rule is clear in this classic situation because
provisions of section 14(d) clearly define when an offer commences. 46
The term "tender offer" has been broadened beyond the classic situa-
tion to include transactions lacking the characteristics of an orthodox
transaction. 47 Two justifications proffered for this expansion are: "1) that
Congress intentionally left the definition of 'tender offer' open in order to
subject to regulation offers involving the same 'evils' as the conventional
offer; and 2) that the securities laws should be interpreted liberally to re-
flect their remedial purposes."48 One non-classic situation to receive ex-
panded interpretations of "tender offer" occurs when acquirers engage in
side agreements with target employee-shareholders in the context of a
traditional tender offer.
4 9
III. EXAMINING THE "FUNCTIONAL," "INTEGRAL PART OF THE TENDER
OFFER" AND "BRIGHT-LINE TIMING" TESTS
The lack of guidance from the SEC and the United States Supreme
Court as to what constitutes a tender offer in this non-classic situation has
of Williams Act); W. McNeil Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAw. 1091 (1968)
(describing procedure and principal features of tender process); Hugh Sowards &
James Mofsky, Corporate Take-over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST.
JOHNS L. REv. 499 (1967) (discussing inadequacy of investor protection as result of
increasing use of cash tender offers).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (2001) (providing Rule 14d-2). Rule 14d-2 states
in part:
Date of commencement. A bidder will have commenced its tender offer for
purposes of section 14(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78n) and the rules under
that section at 12:01 a.m. on the date when the bidder has first published,
sent or given the means to tender to security holders.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d at 950 (applying eight-factor
Wellman test to distinguish between private transactions and tender offers); Hanson
Trust, 774 F.2d at 57 (analogizing SEC v. Ralston Purina, court defined tender offer
by asking whether "there appears to be a likelihood that unless the pre-acquisition
filing strictures of that statute are followed there will be a substantial risk that solic-
itees will lack information needed to make a carefully considered appraisal of the
proposal put before them"); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (creating eight-factor test to determine question of private transac-
tion or tender offer).
48. See Andr6, supra note 45, at 502 (explaining expansion of term "tender
offer" beyond its original meaning); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652-53
(1988) (recognizing broad remedial goals in enacting securities laws); Smallwood
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (asserting that Congress
intended definition of "tender offer" to be developed on case-by-case basis).
49. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 245 (7th Cir. 1996) (following
time table set out by Rule 14d-2); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 655 (9th Cir.
1995) (asking if transaction was integral to tender offer), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump,
850 F.2d 938, 943-44 (2d Cir. 1988) (looking at side transactions under totality of
circumstances).
11
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resulted in the circuit split that is the focus of this Comment.50 Part III
will describe and analyze the three different approaches courts have estab-
lished to define the term "tender offer."
A. The "Functional" Test
When faced with a purported withdrawal of a tender offer, followed
by a private transaction to acquire stock, and then the announcement of a
new tender offer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that a violation of Rule 14d-10 occurred. 5 1 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court in Field v. Trump52 applied a "functional test" which
"scrutinizes such purchases in the context of various salient characteristics
of tender offers and the purposes of the Williams Act" to determine'if the
purchase of a corporation's shares are a privately negotiated transaction or
part of a tender offer. 53
The court reasoned that the All Holders/Best Price Rule would be
completely unenforceable if offerors were permitted to announce "with-
drawals," make private purchases of stock and then commence a "new"
tender offer. 54 Consequently, the court determined that purchases made
after the withdrawal of a tender offer may constitute a continuation of the
tender offer.5 5 For a withdrawal to be effective, a genuine intent to aban-
don the goal of the original offer is required.5 6 Based on these determina-
tions, the court concluded that in this case the acquirer's intent to gain
50. For a further discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 51-53, 59-61, 91-
92 and accompanying text.
51. See Field, 850 F.2d at 944-45 (stating holding).
52. 850 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988).
53. See Field, 850 F.2d at 943-45 (citing SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.,
760 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985); Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56-57
(2d Cir. 1985)) (noting that Williams Act does not define tender offer).
54. See id. at 944-45 (demonstrating how Rule 14d-10 would be undermined if
every purported withdrawal was given effect).
55. See id. (setting forth rationale for finding one single tender offer); see also
Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying totality of
circumstances test to find no tender offer). According to the Field court, the lan-
guage of Section 14(d) (7) of the Exchange Act further supported the idea that
changing the terms of a tender offer by increasing the consideration should be
treated as a continuation of the original tender offer rather than as a new offer.
See Field, 850 F.2d at 944 ("Section 14(d) (7) itself explicitly treats a material change
in the terms of a tender offer in the form of an increased price as a continuation of
the original offer. . ."). Additionally, in reaching its holding, the court summarily
noted that the label an acquirer gives to a transaction is not determinative to the
transaction's classification as a tender offer. See id. at 944-45 ("Whether the acqui-
sition of shares in a corporation is part of a tender offer for purposes of the Act
cannot be determined by rubber-stamping the label used by the acquiror."). The
Field court's concern was that the Williams Act could easily be evaded if acquirers
could simply call any offer to purchase stock a private transaction. See id. at 944
(explaining ramifications of allowing rubber-stamping of labels).
56. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 59 (finding that termination of tender offer
was not "false, fraudulent or ineffective").
[Vol. 47: p. 677
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control of the company was present at all times.5 7 Consequently, the Sec-
ond Circuit ruled that the acquisition of shares was accomplished through
a single tender offer subject to the All Holders/Best Price Rule. 58
B. The "Integral Part of the Tender Offer" Test
The "integral part of the tender offer" test examines whether an in-
sider deal is so material to a tender offer that it should be characterized as
part of the tender offer. 59 In making this determination, the court will
weigh the relative importance of the side transaction at issue to the success
of the tender offer in order.60 In Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,6 1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the 'Ninth Circuit conducted this balancing test and
found a violation of Rule 14d-10.
In Epstein, a corporation executed a takeover through a tender of-
fer.62 While still negotiating the sale of the company, the corporation en-
tered into separate dealings with two high-level employee-shareholders of
57. See Field, 850 F.2d at 945 (stating that acquirer's actions showed persisting
intent to gain control).
58. See id. at 944-45 (integrating tender offer, private agreement, and subse-
quent tender offer into single tender offer). The court determined that the stated
purpose of the withdrawal, to allow for negotiations with the Stroums, was indica-
tive of a continuing intent to pursue the acquisition. See id. at 945 (finding no
genuine intent to abandon). The court also found guidance concerning the inte-
gration of tender offers from various registration exemptions under the Securities
Act of 1933. See id. (citing L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REcULATION 577
n.33 (1983) (suggesting comparison of integration under Securities Act and inte-
gration of tender offers)). The SEC has identified the following criteria as relevant
in governing the integration of formally separate offerings: "1) 'are the offerings
part of a single plan of financing; 2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same
class of security; 3) are the offerings made at or about the same time.. .?'" See id.
(discussing section 3(a) (11) exemption for local offerings). The Field court cre-
ated analogous factors to govern integration of formally separate tender offers: 1)
are the offers all small parts of one larger acquisition; 2) does each offer request
the tender of identical classes of securities; and 3) are the offers made close in
time to each other? See id. (weighing these factors to find no intent to abandon
goal of original tender offer). Upon finding that the withdrawal was ineffective,
the court dismissed the defendants' Rule 14d-2 claim because the rule "merely
creates a window of time during which a genuine withdrawal leaves matters for all
legal purposes as though [the] tender offer had never been commenced" and
"does nothing to alter the principle that the mere announcement of a withdrawal
may not be effective if followed by ... conduct inconsistent with a genuine intent
to withdraw." Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
59. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 656 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
"integral part" test is met when side transaction is conditioned on tender offer
terms).
60. See id. ("Because the terms of the Wasserman Capital Contribution and
Loan Agreement were in several material respects conditioned on the terms of the
public tender offer, we can only conclude that the Wasserman transaction was an
integral part of the offer and subject to Rule 14d-10's requirements.").
61. 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995).
62. See id. at 647 (providing facts of case).
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the acquired company.63 One of the employee-shareholders exchanged
his shares one hour and twenty minutes after the tender offer expired. 64
The issue presented before the Ninth Circuit was whether this agreement
was "during" the tender offer. 65
The employee-shareholder argued that the transaction fell com-
pletely outside Rule 14d-10 because the shares were exchanged after the
tender offer period ended.66 To the employee-shareholder's discredit,
however, neither the courts, the SEC nor Congress have limited the term
"tender offer" to a specified time period. 6 7 In fact, to read such a mechan-
ical provision into the securities law would encourage bidders to proffer
inequitable tender offers-the result 14d-10 was implemented to avert. 68
By finalizing the more favorable agreements after the time period had
passed, bidders could escape Rule 14d-10 liability. 6 9 Such a result, the
Epstein court warned, "would drain Rule 14d-10 of all its force." 70 Conse-
quently, the court looked not at when the transaction was made, but at
whether the transaction was an integral part of the tender offer.
7 1
63. See id. (identifying "Capital Contribution and Loan Agreement" as ar-
rangement to acquire executive's stock). According the agreement, the executive
would take stock in a newly formed subsidiary of the acquirer as opposed to the
cash tender price. See id. (explaining special arrangement). It was stipulated that
this transaction was designed to save millions of dollars in tax liability. See id. (ex-
plaining purpose of special arrangement).
64. See id. at 653 (establishing when Capital Contribution and Loan Agree-
ment was performed).
65. See id. at 654 (identifying possible Rule 14d-10 violations). Plaintiffs al-
leged that both of these transactions represented premiums paid for target stock
in violation of Rule 14d-10. See id. at 648 (stating facts). Defendants argued that
the payments were not made "during" the tender offer and therefore were outside
the ambit of Rule 14d-10. See id. at 654 (describing facts).
66, See id. (arguing that liability under Rule 14d-10 is purely question of tim-
ing). While acknowledging that Rule 14d-10 does not contain any explanation of
what is meant by "during such tender offer," the executive shareholder advocated
that Rule 14d-10 incorporates the time frame set out by Rule 10b-13, which prohib-
its side purchases "from the time [a] tender offer or exchange offer is publicly
announced or otherwise made known ... [to security holders] until the expiration
of the period ... during which securities tendered pursuant to such tender offer
or exchange offer may be the terms of such offer be accepted or rejected." Id. at
655 (alteration in original) (quoting former Rule lOb-13).
67. See id. at 654 (discarding defendant's mechanical application of Rule 14d-
10). The legislative history of Rule 14d-10 demonstrates that SEC wanted to pre-
vent inequities in tender offers. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 10 (1967) (emphasizing
need for "equality of treatment among all shareholders who tender their shares").
For a further discussion on the purpose of Rule 14d-10, see supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
68. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654 (discarding defendant's mechanical application
of Rule 14d-10).
69. See id. at 655 (raising concerns over defendant's timing approach).
70. See id. (noting that even most blatant discriminatory offer could be struc-
tured outside tender period and Rule 14d-10).
71. See id. (identifying Ninth Circuit's test).
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The court found two elements of the employee-shareholder transac-
tion especially damaging. First, the terms of the transaction alluded to the
tender offer price. 72 Second, the entire transaction rested on whether the
bidder could acquire a sufficient number of shares from the tender of-
fer.7 3 "Because the terms of the Wasserman Capital Contribution and
Loan Agreement were in several material respects conditioned on the
terms of the public tender offer, [the Ninth Circuit concluded] that the
Wasserman transaction was an integral part of the offer and subject to
Rule 14d-10's requirements."
74
A year after Epstein, a district court in the Ninth Circuit revisited the
issue in Perera v. Chiron Corp.75 In Perera, an acquiring company proffered
a $117 per share tender offer for the stock of a target company and also
promised to improve certain employee stock options.76 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California found that there was
evidence to support a claim that the option enhancements offered to em-
ployee-shareholders were paid not as compensation for employment, but
rather as incentives to induce the tender of their target stock.77 Following
Epstein, the court deemed that payments for the purpose of inducing the
tender of target stock are consideration for, and integral to, the tender
offer.78
Three elements of the enhancements supported their integration
into the tender offer. First, the option enhancements were contained in
the same agreement as the terms of the tender offer. 79 Second, the ac-
quirer attached the same value to the tender offer and the option en-
hancements. 80  Third, receipt of the option enhancements was
72. See id. at 653 (explaining factors justifying conclusion that "integral part"
test was met).
73. See id. at 656 (explaining inside transaction). Had the tender offer been
unsuccessful, the executive shareholder would have retained his target stock. See
id. (explaining importance of tender offer to insider transaction). An arrange-
ment such as this is identical to the conditions and purposes of tender offers. See
id. (comparing tender offer and insider transaction). If the number of tendered
shares were less than what the acquirer was seeking, no shares would be purchased
pursuant to the offer and each shareholder would have retained his or her target
stock. See id. (finding insider transaction effectively same as tender offer).
74. Id.
75. See Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725SW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22503 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (applying appellate court standard).
76. See id. at *3 (stating facts). Generally speaking, the option enhancements
provided increased benefits and value to existing stock options owned by the target
employees. See id. at *6-7 (describing option enhancements).
77. See id. at *12 (refusing to grant defendants' motion to dismiss).
78. See id. (defining "consideration" for Rule 14d-10 purposes).
79. See id. at *9 (identifying reasons why option enhancements were not sepa-
rate from tender offer).
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conditioned upon a successful tender offer.8 1 In reaching its holding, the
court emphasized that Rule 14d-10 "prohibits tender offers on a first-
come, first-serve basis, or those in which larger or more influential share-
holders are paid a premium for their shares."8 2
Katt v. Titan Acquisitions83 was the most recent case to follow the Ep-
stein approach.8 4 In Katt, a tender offer acquirer agreed to honor various
golden parachute agreements, sign on bonuses and retention agreements
with target company employees upon successful completion of the tender
offer.85 A shareholder of the target company alleged that these agree-
ments constituted increased compensation paid to the employee-share-
holders in order to induce their participation in the tender offer.8 6
After examining all three standards in detail, the court determined
that the congressional purpose as well as the SEC's view was best served by
the "integral part" approach.8 7 Having discussed at length which standard
is most appropriate, the court provided only a very brief explanation as to
its ruling that the agreements were integral to the tender offer. The court
observed that the agreements were made only months before the tender
offer's announcement and that the employees' contractual rights under
the agreements were dependent upon the tender offer.88 From this, the
court concluded that the agreements were "inextricably joined" and inte-
gral to the tender offer. 89 Furthermore, the court found the agreements
to constitute additional consideration paid in violation of Rule 14d-10.9 0
81. See id. (identifying reasons why option enhancements were not separate
from tender offer).
82. Id. at *8 (interpreting Rule 14d-10 to ensure that all holders of same se-
curity are offered same consideration).
83. 133 F. Supp. 2d 632 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
84. See also Millionerrors Inv. Club v. Gen. Elec. Co. PLC, No. Civ. A. 99-781,
2000 WL 1288333, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2000) (following "integral part" test as
well).
85. See Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35 (providing facts).
86. See id. (stating issue). Defendants' counter argument is that the agree-
ments at issue were made prior to the tender offer and the awards were paid subse-
quently, therefore, no shares were purchased for a greater amount during the
offer. See id. at 635 (explaining defendants' position).
87. See id. at 644 (determining that controlling issue is whether golden para-
chute agreements were "integrally tied to successful completion of tender offer").
Despite declining to follow the "bright-line timing" test approach of the Seventh
Circuit, the court noted that "there is clearly merit in a bright-line rule approach."
See id. (suggesting support for bright-line rule). For a further discussion on the
congressional purpose and SEC view, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
88. See id. (providing court's analysis).
89. See id. at 644-45 (finding that agreements were integral parts of tender
offer).
90. See id. at 644 (finding agreements "integral parts of Titan's tender offer
and constitute additional consideration to some shareholders").
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C. The "Bright-Line Timing" Test
The "bright-line timing" approach relies on the plain language of
Rule 14d-10 and finds all conduct prior or subsequent to the tender pe-
riod permissible.9 1 This standard was applied by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co. 92
In Lerro, the Quaker Oats Co. sought the acquisition of Snapple,
Inc. 93 Before announcing the tender offer for Snapple stock, the two cor-
porations entered into a merger agreement as well as an agreement giving
exclusive distribution rights of Snapple products to a third company, Se-
lect Beverages, Inc. 94 The primary shareholder/owner of Select was also a
controlling shareholder of Snapple. 95 After 96.5% of the outstanding tar-
get shares were tendered, Snapple orchestrated a short-form merger of
the target company into a fully-owned subsidiary. 96 Plaintiff investors, who
were former Snapple shareholders, claimed that the distribution agree-
ment provided an alleged benefit that was not offered to all other share-
holders. 97 This, plaintiffs claim, amounted to additional consideration
paid to the controlling shareholder during the tender offer. 98
The Lerro court's analysis began under the premise that, prior to the
tender period, Quaker Oats could have purchased the controlling stock at
any price (greater or less than the tender price) without violating the All
Holders/Best Price Rule. 99 According to the court, the rule requires that
"[e]veryone who tenders receives the highest price paid 'during the
tender offer'-not, as plaintiffs would have it, that the minimum price
'during the tender offer' is set by a price paid at some other time. " 100 The
court emphasized that acquirers are free to buy and sell in the open mar-
ket before a tender offer begins, and stressed the necessity of certainty for
such transactions. °10 From the Seventh Circuit's perspective, the required
certainty can only be accomplished by a "bright-line timing" approach. 10 2
91. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
that issue is about "when" rather than "what").
92. 84 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 240 (providing background).
94. Id. (explaining various agreements between Snapple and Quaker).
95. Id. (stating facts). The controlling shareholder had also given Quaker an
option to buy his stock regardless of the success of the tender offer. See id. (ex-
plaining details of transaction). Success of the tender offer was certain, however,
as the controlling shareholder committed to tender 35-47% of Snapple's outstand-
ing stock (his percentage ownership was disputed). See id. (providing facts).
96. Id. (providing background).
97. Id. (stating issue).
98. Id. (stating issue).
99. See id. at 242 (identifying conclusion drawn by district court).
100. Id. at 242-43.
101. See id. at 243 (stressing need for precise "blackout" period when millions
or billions of dollars are at stake).
102. See id. at 243-44 (advocating bright-line rule despite anticipated faults).
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Whether the distribution agreement was "integral" to the tender offer
was irrelevant to the court in determining if a payment greater than the
tender price was paid "during" the tender offer.10 3 Rule 14d-2(a) did pro-
vide guidance, however, and the official commencement date of the
tender offer was established as November 4, 1994.104 The merger and
distribution agreements were entered into three days prior.10 5 Conse-
quently, under a bright-line application of Rule 14d-10, the distribution
agreement was not during the tender offer. 106
Support for the "bright-line timing" standard most recently came
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
in Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp.'0 7 In Walker, a company negotiating its
own acquisition simultaneously approved the payment of "Retention and
Transition Awards" to certain employees following a change in corporate
control.' 0 8 Soon after the transition awards were approved, the company
committed to an "Agreement and Plan of Merger" and then announced a
tender offer. 10 9 The merger agreement contractually obligated the surviv-
ing corporation to honor the transition and retention awards.11 0 Plaintiffs
were shareholders of the acquired company who claimed that the awards
were a "ruse for additional payments" to employee-shareholders prohib-
ited by Rule 14d-10. 11
103. See id. (dismissing plaintiff's Epstein argument). The court assumed that
the agreement was integral to the offer because the controlling shareholder would
not have tendered his stock if he were not satisfied with the deal he was being
offered. See id. at 244 (ignoring necessity of arrangement to tender offer). Fur-
thermore, his commitment to the offer was necessary because the offer could not
be successful without his controlling stock. See id. at 240 (discussing details of
transaction).
104. See id. at 245 (stating date of public announcement as commencement
date of tender offer). For a further discussion of Rule 14d-2, see supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
105. See id. (stating that merger and distribution agreements were executed
on November 1, 1994).
106. See id. at 243, 246 (affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section
14(d) (7) claim).
107. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2001). The Walker court found that the
presence of a short form merger made the reasoning of Lerro most persuasive and
most factually analogous. See Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (finding Lerro most
applicable). The court did not discuss the Katt decision, however, which presented
an almost identical situation to that in Walker, absent the presence of a follow up
short form merger. For a further discussion of Katt, see supra notes 83-90 and
accompanying text.
108. See id. at 1362 (explaining that negotiations were underway when transi-
tion awards were approved). The agreements provided payments to thirteen key
employees following a change in control. Id. (explaining agreements).
109. See id. at 1362-63 (providing facts). The tender offer was announced one
day after the merger agreement was entered into. Id. (explaining acquisition).
The tender of 55% of target stock was secured through an agreement already exe-
cuted with a target executive. Id. (explaining acquisition). The thirteen key em-
ployees collectively owned 3.3% of the target stock. Id. (explaining acquisition).
110. See id. at 1363 (discussing merger agreement).
111. See id. at 1364 (identifying issue).
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As in Lerro, the Walker court's analysis focused on when the transac-
tions occurred relative to each other, and it examined Rule 14d-2 to iden-
tify the dates of commencement and termination of the tender offer. 112 A
bright-line application of Rule 14d-10 set the tender offer period from
November 19, 1999 to December 17, 1999.113 The merger agreement vali-
dating the transition awards was executed on November 14, 1999.114 Be-
cause no additional payments were made during the tender period, the
court found that there was no Rule 14d-10 violation. 11 5
IV. ADOPTION OF A "BRIGHT-LINE TIMING" APPROACH
As the above cases illustrate, ambiguity currently exists regarding ap-
plication of the All Holders/Best Price Rule in acquisition practices com-
mon today. "Functional" and "integral part" approaches provide optimal
investor protection, but both lack the certainty that tender offerors de-
sire. 116 Specifically, in applying these approaches, courts rely on subjec-
tive factors to determine what activity constitutes a tender offer for 14d-10
purposes.11 7 Consequently, acquirers cannot be certain of the result to a
Rule 14d-10 challenge so long as the "functional" and "integral part of the
tender offer" tests* survive.' 18 This uncertainty, combined with the poten-
tial severity of a Rule 14d-10 violation, necessitates that either the Supreme
Court or the SEC settle the matter by fully adopting the "bright-line tim-
ing" approach. Support for a "bright-line timing" standard can be found
in the plain language of section 14(d) (7) and Rule 14d-10, in the legisla-
tive history of the Williams Act and in public policy.
A. Plain Language of Rule 14d-10
The plain language of section 14(d) (7) provides some support for a
"bright-line timing" approach. 1 9 Section 14(d) (7) applies when a bidder
varies the terms of a tender offer "before the expiration thereof."120 A
112. See id. at 1372 (agreeing with Seventh Circuit's use of Rule 14d-2 as
benchmark for defining "during the tender offer").
113. See id. at 1374-75 (stating tender period).
114. See id. (stating date transition agreements were entered into).
115. See id. at 1361 (finding that plaintiff failed to identify any payment made
during pendency of bidder's tender offer).
116. See, e.g., Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996)
("With millions or even billions of dollars at stake, precise definition of the black-
out period is essential .... ).
117. See, e.g., Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725SW, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22503, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (examining factors to determine if
option enhancements were designed to induce tender of employee stock).
118. See Stephen G. Jacobs et al., Special Deals Tied to Tender Offers (Apr. 2001)
(April 2001) (asking "who knows what a court applying the 'functional' or 'integral
part' test would conclude?"), at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub-frames.html.
119. For a further discussion of section 14(d) (7), see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
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literal reading of this section does not cover any transaction subsequent to
the close of the tender offer. 12 1 The SEC also limited application of Rule
14d-10 to purchases made "during such tender offer."' 22 This language
suggests that all conduct outside the time period when shareholders may
tender their shares pursuant to the offer is outside the ambit of the Rule.
Courts choosing not to adopt a "bright-line timing" approach avoid
these requirements by redefining the term "tender offer" to extend be-
yond what Congress, and the bidders who made the offers, had originally
intended.' 23 As the Lerro court correctly pointed out, however, " [t] he dif-
ference between 'during' and 'before' (or 'after') is not just linguistic. It
is essential to permit everyone to participate in the markets near the time
of a tender offer."' 24 Including transactions that take place near in time
to a tender offer as part of the tender offer unjustly creates a minimum
floor price that must be paid to shareholders tendering pursuant to the
offer.' 25 The objective of section 14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-10 is to make
certain that all tendering shareholders receive the same consideration. 126
121. See generally Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 588-90 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (commanding respect for language of securities statutes
and regulations); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (same).
122. For a further discussion of Rule 14d-10, see supra notes 38-39 and accom-
panying text.
123. See Andre, supra note 45, at 504 n.29 (suggesting that congressional in-
tent was to vest rulemaking authority in SEC to regulate withdrawal and proration,
not to regulate what constitutes tender offer) (citing Takeover Bids: Hearings on
H.R 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. (1968) (statement of Chairman
Cohen)).
While it was abundantly clear that the Commission, at least during the
early years of the Williams Act, preferred not to define the term "tender
offer," there is in fact very little evidence to support the view that Con-
gress intentionally left the definition open to allow regulation of unortho-
dox transactions having the same impact as conventional offers.
Id. at 503-04 (citing 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967); Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774
F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1985)). In introducing the Williams Bill before the Senate,
Senator Williams stated: "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor
protection under the Federal securities laws by requiring the disclosure of perti-
nent information to stockholders when persons seek to obtain control of a corpo-
ration by a cash tender offer or through open market or negotiated purchases of
securities." 113 CONG. REc. 854.
124. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1996) (empha-
sizing that such participation is essential to transactions that all investors find
beneficial).
125. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding no continuation of tender offer); Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57 (same);
Kahn v. Va. Ret. Sys., 783 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same), affd on other
grounds, 13 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 1993); Priddy v. Edelman, 679 F. Supp. 1425, 1431-32
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (permitting transactions prior to and after tender offer), aff'd on
other grounds, 883 F.2d 438, 446 (6th Cir. 1989).
126. For a further discussion explaining the purpose of the Best Price provi-
sion, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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These provisions do not eliminate a bidder's ability to purchase stock in
the open market near in time to a tender offer.
1 27
Furthermore, purchases near in time to a tender offer will often be
essential to an acquisition, and therefore "integral," just by the fact that
acquisitions are accomplished by buying up stock. 128 But, "integral to" is




There is also legislative history support to interpreting the phrase
"during such tender offer" as establishing a rigid time period. 13
0
Proposed section 14(d)(7) would provide that where a person
making a tender offer increases the consideration offered to
shareholders before the expiration of the tender offer, he must pay the
increased consideration to those who tendered their securities
prior to the increase in price, whether or not he had taken up
any of the securities before the increase of consideration was an-
nounced. The purpose of this provision is to assure fair treat-
ment of those persons who tender their shares at the beginning of the
tender period, and to assure equality of treatment among all share-
holders who tender their shares. 131
This supports the conclusion that Congress intended section 14(d) (7) to
denote a rigid time period. 132 The passage speaks of protection against
127. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 56 (holding that open market purchases
prior to tender offer are not within scope of Williams Act).
128. See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that CEO and COO held more than six million shares of target stock), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
129. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 244-46 (distinguishing between "what" and "when"
regarding commencement of offer); see also Andre, supra note 45, at 504-05 (sug-
gesting that best-price rule only makes sense in context of conventional tender
offer).
130. See Andr6, supra note 45, at 503-05 (suggesting that conventional tender
offers considered by Congress had clear commencement dates).
[I] t would appear that Congress, in the withdrawal, proration, and best
price provisions, was addressing specific concerns that had arisen in the
context of the conventional offer. Where these statutory safeguards can-
not be applied because of the mechanical process by which an offer is
made renders them meaningless, the case for finding that Congress in-
tended to regulate the offer as a tender offer becomes much weaker.
Id. at 505 (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195,
1207 (2d Cir. 1978) ("It seems unlikely that Congress intended 'tender offer' to be
so broadly interpreted as to make these provisions unworkable."); Brascan, Ltd. v.
Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 790-91 (S.D.N.Y 1979); Wurczinger, Toward
a Definition of Tender Offer, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 201 (1982)).
131. H.R. REP. No. 90-1711 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2821
(emphasis added).
132. See Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1375-76
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (analyzing legislative history).
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price discrimination from the "beginning of the tender period" up until
"expiration of the tender offer."1 33 The following SEC release regarding
Rule 14d-10 provides further support:
If more than one type of consideration is offered pursuant to the
tender offer, the types of consideration must be substantially
equivalent in value. The date for making the initial determination as
to substantial equivalence in value is the earlier of the date of public
announcement as specifled in Rule 14d-2(b), or the date of commence-
ment as defined in Rule 14d-2(a).134
This release strongly suggests that the All Holders/Best Price Rule is
targeted at conduct during the tender period, as defined by Rule 14d-2's
timing provisions. 13 5
It is also important to consider other securities regulations and ac-
tions that are contingent upon the commencement of a tender offer.136
The disclosure requirements of Rules 14d-3 and 14d-6 require bidders to
file a tender offer statement with the SEC and to disseminate this informa-
tion to shareholders. 13 7 These requirements become effective upon com-
mencement of a tender offer and cannot be met by a potential bidder
during the negotiation period.' 38 Thus, if the "integral part" standard es-
tablishes commencement of the offer during the negotiations, then the
offer will have taken place in violation of these rules because the required
disclosures were not made.' 39 Moreover, Rule 14e-1 requires a tender of-
fer to stay "open for [twenty] days from the time it is 'first published or
sent or given to security holders."140 If the offer commences upon nego-
tiations of private transactions, the twenty-day window may expire just
133. See id. at 1376 (drawing timing conclusions).
134. Id. (citing SEC Release Nos. 33-6595; 34-22198, 50 Fed. Reg. 27976,
27978-9 (July 9, 1985) (emphasis added)).
135. See id. at 1377 (supporting application of Rule 14d-2 to Rule 14d-10).
The passage incorporates Rule 14d-2's timing provision as to when the tender offer
is deemed to have commenced. Id. (examining SEC release). It also indicates
that "the purpose of the Rule was to prevent a decrease in the share price by the
bidder during the offer period, focusing again on the time during the pendency of
the offer." Id.
136. See Andr6, supra note 45, at 504 (identifying discrepancies that support
application of Williams Act only to conventional tender offers); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.§ 78n(d)(5) (2001) (providing withdrawal rights); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2001)
(affording proration protection); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (2001) (creating Best
Price rule).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (3), (6) (2001) (providing regulation on filing and
transmitting of tender offer statement, and disclosure of tender offer information
to security holders).
138. See Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing other Williams Act timetables).
139. See id. (discussing other Williams Act timetables).
140. See id. (finding purpose of this provision is to give unsophisticated inves-
tors opportunity to study documents and make informed decisions).
[Vol. 47: p. 677
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/6
2002] COMMENT 699
prior to the date that acceptance of tendered shares begins. 1 41 Such a
situation would revive "Saturday night specials" and the pressures the Wil-
liams Act was designed to eradicate. 14 2 Because of the time sensitivity of
Regulation 14D, it would "wreak havoc to say that the operation of all
clocks cannot be known until, years after the events, ajudge declares when
negotiations became sufficiently serious to mark the commencement of
the offer."' 4 3 Rule 14d-2 eliminates confusion regarding tender offer
timetables by clearly establishing the commencement of tender offers.
1 44
C. Public Policy
Securing clarity and finality of acquisitions provides a strong policy
argument in favor of a "bright-line timing" approach. 145 "In a business
setting, it is impractical to leave the validity of [arrangements to acquire
employee stock] and the legality of ensuing tender offers subject to end-
less litigation." 14 6 With millions and even billions of dollars on the line, a
precise definition of "tender offer" is essential. 1 47 Any application of the
All Holders/Best Price Rule to transactions outside the plain meaning of
"during such tender offer" destroys clarity and finality.
Treating negotiations and private transactions prior to actual tender
periods as commencement of the offer risks more than just an immediate
Rule 14d-10 violation. 1 48 Doing so would forbid many of the pre-tender
141. See id. (explaining need for clear commencement date for other Wil-
liams Act provisions).
142. See id. (discussing need to avoid pressured investor decisions). Timeta-
bles for withdrawal and proration rights begin to run upon commencement of the
offer as well, and would also be befuddled by a conclusion that private negotiations
commence a tender offer. See id. (reasoning that commencement cannot be estab-
lished during negotiations). Closing the proration pool prior to public announce-
ment of the offer would defeat the purposes of the Williams Act and SEC
regulation. See id. (asserting that tender offer must commence upon announce-
ment to public).
143. Id.
144. See id. (supporting incorporation of Rule 14d-2 timetable into Rule 14d-
10).
145. See Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377-78
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (recognizing "'a need to provide clarity and certainty in the regu-
latory scheme applicable to tender offer with respect to equal treatment of security
holders'") (citing SEC Release Nos. 33-6653; 34-23421, 50 Fed. Reg. 25873, 25881
(July 17, 1986)).
146. See id. (stating need for certainty).
147. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243 (stating need for certainty).
148. See id. at 246 (stating that effects of vague commencement dates would
be far reaching). Because side transactions are unlawful once the offer begins,
treating private transactions as commencement of the tender offer would outlaw a
bidder from participating in the market prior to a tender offer completely. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-5 (2001) (prohibiting all side transactions once tender offer com-
mences). For a further discussion of the potential effects of treating negotiations
and private transactions as commencement of the tender offer, see supra notes
134-40, 145 and accompanying text and infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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bargains necessary to a successful acquisition. 149 Inability to complete pri-
vate transactions would also lessen the attractiveness of acquisitions gener-
ally, thereby reducing the tender price bidders offer.' 50 Finally, leaving
the commencement issue ambiguous will encourage litigants to challenge
any agreement executed in close proximity to a tender offer. 15 1 Accord-
ingly, holding these transactions out as extensions of tender offers, subject
to the Williams Act, will have a chilling effect on tender offers and impact
negatively on investors. 152
The "bright-line timing" approach, by allowing essential transactions
both before and after a tender offer, provides the certainty that bidders
require. In accomplishing this objective, the "bright-line timing" ap-
proach also fulfills the purposes of the Williams Act and Rule 14d-10.153
149. See Jacobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub_
frames.html (identifying threatened transactions such as equity rollover, stay-bo-
nuses, and retention and employment agreements); see also Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246
(proffering that effects would go beyond having to pay additional consideration in
one instance).
150. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246 (explaining consequences of ambiguous com-
mencement dates).
151. See Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-78 (expressing concern over integrat-
ing tender offers and second-step mergers).
152. See Jacobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub_
frames.html ("Ultimately, the only way that a target and bidder may be able to
shield a side deal from a potential Rule 14d-10 attack is to abandon the tender
offer entirely and to effect the transaction as a long-form merger."). Such a course
of action would have the detrimental effect of causing public shareholders to wait
longer to receive consideration for their target shares and this additional time pe-
riod may encourage interlopers. See id. (identifying consequence of long-form
mergers). "It... seems troubling that Rule 14d-10 could have such a large impact
on choice of form for the transaction because that was not the rule's intended
purpose when enacted." Id.; see also Lerro, 84 F.3d at 242-43 (positing conse-
quences of finding Rule 14d-10 violation). In a hypothetical offered by the court
in Lerro, the court considered a firm whose stock is trading for $20. See id. at 243
(setting out hypothetical). "Insiders who hold 30 percent of the firm would not
sell for less than $30, and a potential bidder values the entire firm at $25 per
share." Id. An offer extended to everyone at $25 per share would not be successful
because it would not have the support of the controlling shareholders. See id. (ex-
plaining hypothetical). If the acquirer could pay $30 per share to the controlling
shareholders and extend a tender offer for the remaining shares at $22 per share,
however, the tender offer would be successful and all parties would benefit. See id.
(explaining benefits of situation described in hypothetical). In this manner, the
controlling shareholders received their required price, the bidder obtained all
shares at an average price of $24.40 per share (sixty cents less than what they were
willing to pay) and the remaining shareholders earned $2 above the current mar-
ket value. See id. (describing results of hypothetical). The $30 per share transac-
tion with the insiders was integral to the success of the tender offer, but "[t] reating
the Williams Act as a mandate for an identical price across the board . . . would
make all investors worse off." Id.
153. For a further discussion of the purposes of the Williams Act and Rule
14d-10, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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This standard does not create the pressure decisions of "Saturday
night specials" that Regulation 14D was designed to eliminate. 15 4 Coer-
cion in these situations stemmed from offers being extended for very brief
time periods and by the practice of accepting only a limited number of
shares on a first-come, first-serve basis. 155 Such pressures are not created
by special transactions made with inside shareholders before the tender
offer because investors who participate in the tender offer still get full dis-
closure of the terms of the offer and the bidder. Furthermore, they are
guaranteed the prorated acceptance of their tendered shares at the high-
est price paid during the offer. 156
The Williams Act does not entitle shareholders participation in a pri-
vate transaction extended to other parties before the tender offer.157 Just
as those who sell their stock in the open market for $20 today cannot
complain if their trading partner purchased the same stock for $30 from
another person yesterday, those who tender their shares pursuant to an
offer cannot claim that they are entitled to a price paid during a private
transaction before the tender offer. 158 A "bright-line timing" standard
supports this idea, while an "integral part" approach allows for its abuse.
Proponents of the "functional" and "integral part" tests often criticize
the "bright-line timing" approach for the opportunity it provides unscru-
pulous investors to evade the All Holders/Best Price Rule merely by tim-
ing their transaction so that they take place outside the tender period. 159
While this may be true in certain situations, the need for certainty out-
weighs the potential for abuse.1 60 Furthermore, competing interests in
154. For a further discussion of "Saturday night specials" and other concerns,
see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
155. For a further discussion of coercive situations, see supra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
156. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir.
1985) (identifying purpose of Act to "provide shareholders an opportunity to ex-
amine all relevant facts to ... reach decisions without... unwarranted pressure").
For a further discussion on the protections afforded by the Williams Act, see supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Lerro, 84 F.3d at 239 (finding such transactions outside tender
offer). Gratifying the desire of any given shareholder to obtain a deal extended
only to another shareholder is not the purpose of the Williams Act. But see Maxick
v. Cadence Design Sys., No. C-00-0658-PJH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14099, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2000) (finding timing irrelevant).
158. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243 (providing illustration).
159. See generally Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995) (demon-
strating concern for "bright-line timing" standard), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Field v. Trump, 850
F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632
(M.D. Tenn. 2000) (same); Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725SW, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22503 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (same).
160. See Andre, supra note 45, at 502 (supporting restricted interpretation of
"tender offer" to original meaning for certain provisions of Regulation 14D); Ja-
cobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pubframes.html (argu-
ing for adoption of bright-line); Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (criticizing
"integral part" and "functional" tests).
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"avoiding undue interference with the free and open market in securities"
supports a "bright-line timing" standard. 16 1 In any event, allowing transac-
tions to take place prior to a tender offer under a mechanical application
of Rule 14d-2 will still not pressure shareholders into making uninformed
decisions of the kind that the Williams Act was concerned with.1 62
V. IDENTIFYING ELEMENTS OF THE "BRIGHT-LINE TIMING" APPROACH TO
PLAN FUTURE TRANSACTIONS
Until the "bright-line timing" approach is uniformly accepted, results
of a Rule 14d-10 challenge will be unpredictable. While this uncertainty is
highly unappealing to those attempting to structure inside dealings close
in time to tender offers, several commentators have identified steps that
may be taken when structuring insider transactions. 163 For instance, iden-
tifying transactional elements common to each disparate approach for de-
fining tender offer should increase the likelihood of receiving favorable
"bright-line timing" treatment if the transaction is later challenged under
Rule 14d-10. 16 4 Some degree of certainty can thus be achieved by struc-
turing employment and retention arrangements in a manner that avoids
situations found to be crucial to courts in applying the "integral part of the
tender offer" and "functional" standards.16 5
A. Transactional Elements Indicative of the "Functional" and
"Integral Part" Approaches
As demonstrated in Field, the "functional" approach appears limited
to three-part "step transactions." First, the bidder makes a tender offer.
Then, the bidder drops the tender offer in order to negotiate a private
purchase. Finally, the bidder announces a second tender offer.16 6
161. See Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d at 948 (citing City Investing Co. v.
Simcox, 633 F.2d 56, 62 n.14 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting less burdensome regulations
in cases involving certain open market purchases)).
162. For a further discussion of the concerns that the Williams Act was de-
signed to remedy, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
163. See Jacobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub_
frames.html (discussing confusion regarding Rule 14d-10); Shearman & Sterling,
supra note 1, at 3 ("The [Katt] Court's reluctance to dismiss the plaintiffs action is
troubling given the importance of, and the current market practice of, structuring
appropriate employment arrangements with key personnel as a significant part of
the acquisition process."). For a further discussion of the consequences of com-
mitting a Rule 14d-10 violation, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion on factual distinctions, see infra notes 166-82
and accompanying text.
165. For a further discussion on structuring future transactions with tender
offers, see infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
166. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243 (limiting Field application to step-transactions);
Walker v. Shield Acquisition Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
("Fields broad language purporting to define tender offer for purposes of the Wil-
liams Act is limited to cases involving interrupted tender offers."). Note, however,
that the offers will only be integrated if there was never a genuine intent to aban-
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Identifying the distinguishing elements of the "integral part of the
tender offer" line of cases from Lerro and Walker (the "bright-line timing"
cases) is less clear. 167 The Lerro court determined that the distribution
agreement was neither entered into nor executed during the tender pe-
riod. 168 Likewise, the Walker court found that the promise to pay and the
actual payment of retention awards occurred outside the tender offer. 169
Defendants in each of the "integral part" cases (Epstein, Katt and Perera)
made this same argument to no avail. 170
One explanation for this disparity is that both Lerro and Walker in-
volved a tender offer and a short-form merger governed by state law. 171
Second-step statutory mergers following a successful tender offer do not
constitute a continuation of the tender offer for purposes of section
14(d) (7).172 The lack of follow-up mergers in the "integral part" cases
prevented the courts from linking the challenged transactions to anything
but the tender offers, thereby allowing for application of section
14(d) (7). 1 73 In contrast, consummating agreements with insiders pursu-
ant to merging allowed the courts in Lerro and Walker to view the transac-
tions outside the context of the tender offer. 174
don the offer. See Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985)
(illustrating that transactions near in time to tender offer are permissible if such
transactions standing alone would not constitute tender offer).
167. Compare Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 654 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying
"integral part" test), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), and Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, 133 F. Supp. 2d 632,
641 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (same), and Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725SW,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (same), with Lerro, 84
F.3d at 243 (adopting bright-line test), and Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (adopt-
ing "bright-line timing" test).
168. For an explanation of the Lerro holding, see supra notes 99-106 and ac-
companying text.
169. For an explanation of the Walker holding, see supra notes 112-15 and
accompanying text.
170. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 654 (claiming "'Rule 14d-10 is without effect"'
outside tender period); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (" [D] efendants argue that the
agreements at issue were neither made .nor paid "'during [its] tender offer."');
Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *8 (claiming option enhancements were
made prior to tender offer).
171. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240-41 (setting-forth facts); Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at
1364 (same).
172. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 779 (2d Cir. 1991)
(" [Wie perceive no basis in the language, structure or legislative history of the Act
for viewing a second-step statutory merger following a successful tender offer for
51 percent of a target's shares as a continuation of the tender offer.").
173. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656 (finding material aspects of capital loan agree-
ment conditioned to, and therefore integral to, tender offer); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d
at 646 (ruling that agreements may have been designed to induce tender offer);
Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *12 (finding sufficient evidence to support
conclusion that enhancements were premiums to encourage tender of shares).
174. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 244 (refusing to integrate any tender offer and fol-
low-up merger); Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (rejecting argument that tender
offer and merger could constitute single transaction).
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Differences also exist in the ways in which the agreements in each
case related to the tender offer. 175 In Lerro and Walker, "conditioning the
effectiveness of the [agreements] on the successful consummation of the
tender offer was seemingly necessary and logical."' 76 In both cases, the
court was satisfied that the transactions were not designed to induce suc-
cess of the tender offer. 177 This was not the case in Katt, Epstein or Perera
because no independent. basis or purpose beyond the context of the
tender offer existed for any of these agreements. Consequently, it was
found that each was designed to.induce the benefited shareholders' par-
ticipation in the offer.
178
Another factor proven to be damaging in the "integral part" cases is
setting the amount to be paid under the agreement as a function of the
tender price. Both Epstein and Perera found that incorporating the tender
offer price by reference in the disputed agreements demonstrated that the
agreements were material to the tender offer. 179 In contrast, in Lerro and
Walker, the alleged additional consideration was irrespective of the tender
price. 180 Finally, proximity in time of the agreements to the tender offer
has been a relevant factor for courts finding the "integral part" test more
175. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 653-57 (noting that agreement was not binding if
tender offer was not successful, that exchange was to take place upon consumma-
tion of tender offer and that redemption value set as tender price); Katt, 133 F.
Supp. 2d at 644-45 (observing that agreements only paid if tender offer was suc-
cessful); Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *9 (noting that tender price and
option price were identical and all provisions of enhancement agreement were
conditioned on tender offer).
176. See Jacobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub-
frames.html (distinguishing Lerro and Epstein); see also Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240 (ex-
plaining distribution agreement). Quaker could not grant Select exclusive rights
to distribute Snapple until it owned Snapple. See id. (describing distribution agree-
ment). Consequently, the distribution agreement had to be conditioned on a suc-
cessful tender offer because Quaker did not have the ability to assign the rights if it
was not. See id. (explaining distribution agreement); see also Walker, 145 F. Supp.
2d at 1364 (explaining retention awards). Because the retention bonuses became
effective upon merger if the employees stayed with the new Vallen Corporation,
they were implicitly contingent on the success of the tender offer because there
would be no merger if the tender offer failed. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240 (describing
distribution agreement).
177. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 246 (finding transaction valid); Walker, 145 F. Supp.
2d at 1364 (same).
178. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 656 (holding transaction as integral to tender of-
fer); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (finding possible inducement); Perera, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22503, at-*12 (same). "It seems that these agreements could not be
considered anything other than additional consideration" to induce the tender of
shares because they had no other justifiable purpose. SeeJacobs et al., supra note
118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pubjframes.html (distinguishing Lerro and Ep-
stein); see also Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240 (distinguishing "integral part" cases).
179. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 653 (noting that redemption value set as tender
price); Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *9 (noting that tender price and
option price were identical).
180. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240 (identifying distribution agreement as potential
source of additional consideration); Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (identifying
retention bonuses as alleged ruse to pay insiders more).
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appropriate. 8 1 In the "bright-line timing" cases, the agreements at issue
naturally followed the respective changes in control. 182
B. Planning Future Transactions
Having. identified these elements, future transactions should be struc-
tured in a manner that avoids resemblance to transactions that have re-
ceived "functional" and "integral part" scrutiny. Companies should
structure employment or retention arrangements in a manner that facili-
tates the independence of the agreements from the tender offer. 18 3 As
Field demonstrates, acquirers should never withdraw a tender offer, negoti-
ate a private purchase of stock and then announce a new tender offer. 1 8 4
Agreements should not be contingent upon the outcome of the tender
offer, but instead should become binding without regard to the offer's
success. 185 If this is not an option, arrangements should be made prior to
the tender offer to consummate any such agreement pursuant only to a
follow-up merger, as opposed to the tender offer itself.186
Companies should not associate the number of shares owned by a
target employee to the employee's compensation. 18 7 Insider transactions
should never pay the employee an amount referenced by the tender
181. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 653 (noting that Wasserman exchange to take
place "immediately following" tender offer); Katt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 644-45 (em-
phasizing that agreements were entered into months shortly before tender offer);
Perera, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *9 (finding relevant fact that tender offer
provisions and option enhancements were contained in same investment
agreement).
182. See Lerro, 84 F.3d at 244 (noting that Quaker could not enter into distri-
bution agreement prior to acquiring Snapple); Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1375
(finding promise to pay and actual payment of transition awards fell outside
tender period).
183. See Jacobs et al., supra note 118, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pub_
frames.html (offering guidance in structuring future transactions). For a further
discussion explaining the greater likelihood of finding a Rule 14d-10 violation
under an "integral part" or "functional" approach, see supra notes 14-15 and ac-
companying text.
184. For a further discussion suggesting that step-transactions will never stand
apart from tender offers, see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
185. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (offering suggestions on
structuring future transactions). Compare Lerro, 84 F.3d at 240 (committing to
tender shares regardless of outcome), with Epstein, 50 F.3d at 653-54 (conditioning
transfer on successful tender offer).
186. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (offering suggestions on
structuring future transactions). For a further discussion illustrating the impor-
tance of conducting a second-step merger, see supra notes 171-74 and accompany-
ing text.
187. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note .1, at 1 (offering suggestions on
structuring future transactions). Compare Perera v. Chiron Corp., No. C-95-20725
SW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22503, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1996) (offering enhance-
ments to options owned by employees), with Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (offer-
ing fixed-price retention awards that were not function of shares owned).
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price.1 88 Additionally, tender offer documents should disclose any agree-
ments reached with employee-shareholders of the target corporation. 1 89
Finally, any award or agreement offered to an employee-shareholder
should serve as an incentive for continued employment only.1 90 Such
agreements should never be used to induce an employee-shareholder to
partake in the offer.191
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the current ambiguities surrounding the application of the
All Holders/Best Price Rule, it would be beneficial for the Supreme Court
or the SEC to put the matter to rest. Uncertainties pertaining to the result
of a Rule 14d-10 claim under the "functional" and "integral part of the
tender offer" approaches, combined with the market's need for clarity,
necessitates the adoption of the "bright-line timing" approach. The plain
language of Rule 14d-10, its legislative history and public policy each offer
further support for the "bright-line timing" standard. "The line is arbi-
trary, to be sure; it invites transactions that use the rules for personal ad-
vantage ... but some line is essential, and it had best be a bright one. '19 2
Therefore, the SEC or the Supreme Court should act and recognize the
"bright-line timing" standard as the single validity test. Through this stan-
dard, Rule 14d-10's ambiguity would finally be removed.
Michael D. Ebert
188. For a further discussion on the damaging effects of. linking employee
compensation to the tender price, see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
189. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (offering suggestions on
structuring future transactions); see also Le-ro, 84 F.3d at 240 (providing distribu-
tion agreement in offering document); Walker, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64 (offer-
ing Solicitation/Recommendation Statement to shareholders).
190. See Shearman & Sterling, supra note 1, at 1 (offering suggestions on
structuring future transactions).
191. See, e.g., Gerber v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 2000 WL 307379 at *4
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that result in Lerro turned on fact that formal announce-
ment of tender offer had been made). For a further discussion proposing that
inducements will almost always render transactions part of tender offer, see supra
notes 175-78 and accompanying text. Other courts have found different distinc-
tions between the "bright-line" and "integral part" cases.
192. Lerro, 84 F.3d at 243.
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